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ABSTRACT 
Author: Marlene Marie Dugan 
Title: Transitory Forecasting Methodology: Passenger/Revenue 
Share and Capacity Share (The S-Curve) 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Year: 2001 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore the relationship between a 
carrier's service/capacity share and passenger share to determine the presence of the s-
curve. The author is unaware of a current, accepted analysis for understanding the s-
curve with any degree of reliability. Regression analysis was used to correlate 
service/capacity share against passenger share for domestic, United States air carriers. 
Carrier ranking was then added as a predicting variable to gain further insight into the 
correlation between service share and passenger share. It is anticipated that this study 
will be beneficial to airline network planners in their analysis of city pair, service share, 
and fleet choices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Planners and Schedulers in the airline industry often analyze the effect of fleet 
assignment and route consolidation or expansion as they strive to optimize schedule 
effectiveness and aircraft utilization. While there are a number of concessions made for 
maintenance, crew schedules, slots, gates and regulatory restrictions, the goal is always to 
maximize revenue on the network. 
The flying public plays a key role in this analysis, as it is their decision regarding 
which carrier to fly that affects the goal of an airline to maximize revenue. There is 
considerable history in the use of Quality Service Indexes (path quality: nonstop, one-
stop, two-stop, etc. service) and service offerings (frequent flyer programs, flight timing 
and number of departures, airline image, etc.) to predict a consumer's choice among 
carriers. However, the author is unaware of any current, accepted s-curve methodology 
for predicting or measuring the relationship between service at a city and the resulting 
capacity share. With an understanding of s-curve characteristics in forecasting capacity 
share as a result of fleet and departure presence in a city, analysts would have an 
additional evaluation tool, enabling them to make more informed decisions regarding 
network strategy. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to test the correlation between service 
characteristics and capacity share in an attempt to better understand s-curve effects when 
making airline network planning choices. This study is based on regression analysis and 
published Department of Transportation annual results. For the purpose of this study, 
carriers are defined as domestic, United States, airlines operating jet or propeller aircraft. 
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Customers and passengers refer to those individuals predisposed to choosing air travel as 
the preferred form of transportation. S-curve describes the phenomenon when a 
transportation provider receives either greater or less than their capacity share in a market 
as a result of a service characteristic. 
Review of Related Literature 
Patterns of social and economic activities influence the need for transportation. 
Understanding the interaction of these activities and their resulting behaviors render a 
framework for the delivery of transportation systems and facilities. Transportation 
demand analysis provides the mechanism for modeling, understanding, and forecasting 
the volumes of traffic that require a transportation infrastructure. A meaningful measure 
of the relationship between traffic volumes and transportation system characteristics, as 
influenced by socioeconomic factors, is essential in designing economically feasible 
transportation systems (Kanafani, 1983). 
Consumer demand is the relationship between traffic volumes and transportation 
cost characteristics. Supply is the way in which transportation providers respond to this 
demand. The demand models are designed to explain how the variables contributing to 
demand interact and forecast future traffic volumes (Kanafani, 1983). Forecasters use 
these models to study the impact and recommend action regarding the demand and 
supply environments. As socioeconomic environments and traffic volumes alter, the 
scrutiny and adaptation of transportation models is required to capture dynamics affecting 
transportation systems (Kanafani, 1983). 
The formal study of transportation demand analysis began as early as the middle 
nineteenth century. During this period, studies focused on the relationship between the 
geography of resources and the shape of transportation networks. Models followed with 
an analysis of migration patterns and the integration of different modes of travel to meet 
consumer demand. Analysts in the early twentieth century focused on urban travel 
activities and behavioral influences. The quantification of human attitudes, psychological 
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characteristics, and the incorporation of random elements constitute some of the recent 
advances in transportation demand analysis (Kanafani, 1983). 
Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, establishing the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) as the regulatory authority governing domestic and interstate 
passenger operations. Its objective was to curb the industry's huge financial losses by 
protecting airlines from excess competition and guaranteeing service to travelers (Dana & 
Schmitt, 1995). The CAB was given authority over all pricing and route decisions, 
mergers, acquisitions, and interline agreements (Dana & Schmitt, 1995). 
The CAB created a route system independent of airline "network" considerations. 
Most of the flight segments were insulated and a point to point service network was 
established. An 80% rule applied to the airlines, where 80% of the flights had to be 
nonstop and 80% of the passengers needed to originate or terminate on the offered route. 
Airlines did not have an incentive to consider non-stop versus a multiple stop network 
(Ippolito, 1981). "Faced with suppressed routing and pricing options, the airlines 
competed on services such as meals, movies, and seating comfort" (Kou, 1995, p. 3). 
At this time, analysts concentrated on air travel versus other modes of 
transportation. Early studies focused on evaluating when travelers and commodities 
progressed from sea to land to air transportation. It was found that as income increased, 
the value of an individual's time increased (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). As the value 
of time and willingness to pay increased, the progression from sea to land to air travel 
occurred. Therefore, as air travel became more economical in total travel cost, it replaced 
automobile travel (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). 
Total travel cost was identified as the out-of-pocket cost of transport plus the 
value travelers place on their personal travel time, where personal travel time is the 
interval between departure from home or office until arrival at a final destination 
(Gronau, 1970). In the case of air transport, this includes waiting time until the next 
flight, origin and transport time to airport, origin terminal processing time, flying time, 
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waiting at intermediate stops, baggage claim, and destination local transport time (Russon 
& HoUingshead, 1989). 
When Hansen (1988) performed his analysis of aircraft operating data and major 
airlines, he found that the airlines' use of a simple linear model was extremely accurate in 
identifying travel time for aircraft types. The only differences resulted between non-stop 
and one-stop activity and whether this one-stop activity resulted in a "fixed time 
component once (direct service) or twice (hubbed service)" (Hansen, 1988, p. 87). As 
intermediate stops increase the total travel time of air transport to the time required for 
driving, "the number of enplaned passengers would diminish to zero irrespective of 
population, income, or flight frequency" (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989, p. 302). 
Russon and HoUingshead (1989) continued this analysis to include price and fare 
elements in the total travel cost. They found that even with a high amount of time 
efficiency, there was a fare threshold where passengers would no longer rule out 
competing modes of travel. They reported that "as air travel becomes more economical, 
it will be substituted for automobile travel." (Russon & Hallingshead, 1989, p. 300). 
The next logical step in the air transport analysis included a consideration of 
passenger income driving airline demand. Hansen (1988) hypothesized that increased 
income levels drove increased demand for leisure travel. He believed this would cause 
additional flight frequencies to be added, decreasing the time variable in total travel cost, 
and thereby continuing to increase the number of passengers seeking to travel by air. 
Douglas and Miller (1974) identified two additional components of total travel 
time. The first component is "frequency delay" or the time between when a passenger 
wishes to travel and the actual departure time. The second component, "scholastic 
delay," results from the possibility that the preferred flight is sold out. Since a passenger 
only recognizes that a flight is not available, the demand model variable becomes the sum 
of the delay times, known as schedule delay (Douglas & Miller, 1974). 
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From an airline perspective, this issue came down to flight frequency and average 
load factor. "The greater the flight frequency, the shorter the average waiting time 
between flights, and the lower the average load factor, the less likely any given flight will 
be sold out" (Abrahams, 1983, p. 385). It was at this time when the s-curve phenomenon 
was first documented. Airline analysts found examples where added capacity resulted in 
a disproportionate share of the available market traffic (Kou, 1995). "In 1975, the CAB 
described the 'so-called s-curve theory' as 'the claim that increases (or reduction) of 
marginal flights (those generating revenues covering out-of-pocket, but not fully 
allocated costs) result in a greater-than-proportional gain (or loss) of market share" 
(O'Connor, 1975, p. 89). 
Studies by Fruhan (1972) supported this theory. He found "that for a carrier to 
increase (or maintain) its market share on the particular route it flies, the carrier must 
expand its seat capacity faster than (or at least as fast as) its competitors" (p. 132). The 
result was a fierce rivalry throughout the industry as airlines purchased aircraft to add 
frequency in an effort to capture that additional market share (Kou, 1995). 
Analysts later learned that the market share advantage of capacity on highly 
competitive markets was short-term and often resulted in over-scheduling (O'Connor, 
1989). There is a point where increased enplaned passengers will increase at a 
decreasing rate with flight frequency, until there is no longer productivity in adding an 
additional flight (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). 
Airlines also spent a considerable amount of money in competition over meals, 
movies, and the size and comfort of aircraft (Dana & Schmitt, 1995). Carriers began to 
show weakened earnings and balance sheets (Kou, 1995). During the 1970's, the 
industry's financial outlook worsened with a drop in consumer demand and the rise of 
fuel and labor costs. To address this issue, the CAB declared a policy of refusing to grant 
new route applications and allowing carriers to cooperatively reduce capacity in high-
density markets (Kou, 1995). The result was approved fare increases with reduction of 
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service on popular routes. Consumers became extremely critical of regulation in the 
airline industry (Kou, 1995). 
In 1976, the Kennedy Report concluded that 
deregulation would allow pricing flexibility, which would stimulate new and 
innovative offerings; allow passengers the range of price and service options 
dictated by consumer demand; enhance carrier productivity and efficiency; and 
increase industry health (Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: 
Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice of the 
Judiciary Committee, 1976). 
A trial period of liberalized entry and pricing mechanisms resulted in financial success, 
new demand, and lower fares (Kou, 1995). 
In October 1978, President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act (Kou, 
1995). Following deregulation, low-cost entrants challenged incumbents with low fares. 
The 1979 fuel crisis, the early 1980's recession, the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike, 
and intense price competition produced the worst financial losses in aviation history. 
More than 150 carriers declared bankruptcy while the average cost of an airline seat 
continued to decline (Kou, 1995). The economic situation thwarted customer traffic, 
causing airline seats to fly empty. It became clear that the longstanding presumption that 
adding flight frequency, and additional seats, in an effort to capture market share, did not 
work in the post regulatory environment (Ippolito, 1981). 
Since seat inventory could not be stored for later use, carriers were losing both the 
value of the seat and the cost to fly the seat (Bamber, 1997). Airlines recognized that to 
stay in business, they needed to find ways to attract customers independent of lowering 
prices (Kou, 1995). This reaction to deregulation was far different from economists' 
original predictions (Peterpaul, 1993). 
The value of filling airplane seats caused significant changes in airline marketing 
and scheduling practices. Passenger preference was hypothesized to be dependent upon 
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schedule convenience, fare, flight frequency, delay due to unavailability, and connection 
delays. Other factors thought to affect the profitability of routes were the population and 
per capita income at origin and destination points (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). 
An emphasis on quality service variables as they affect the number of enplaned 
passengers also became a factor in service offerings (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). 
Non-stop flight frequencies with large and small aircraft and connecting flight 
frequencies were hypothesized to have different impacts on the number of enplaned 
passengers (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). Differences in capacity, comfort, price and 
speed were all thought to be reasons a consumer would first choose a nonstop route in a 
large aircraft. Due to the time impact on total travel cost, connecting flights were 
thought to have a different (negative) impact on consumer choice, providing increased 
transit time, layovers, and a much lower driving/flying time differential (Russon & 
HoUingshead, 1989). 
While most travelers would prefer nonstop service, the number of city-pair 
markets that can sustain nonstop service is quite small. In order to maximize revenue, 
major airlines abandoned point to point scheduling in favor of hub and spoke networks. 
A schedule that provides connections to large numbers of city-pairs allowed hub 
operators to achieve and maintain a higher load factor (percentage of occupied seats) than 
it would if each route were operated as a separate entity (Bamber, 1997). The hub and 
spoke network allowed airlines to provide more service offerings (origins and 
destinations) and make the best use of airplanes, air and ground crews, and gates. 
Consequently, cost per passenger could be reduced (Jeng, 1988). 
Airlines began to consolidate activities over hub operations in an effort to increase 
load factors on flights in and out of the hub airport (Peterpaul, 1993). While this would 
seem to indicate that nonstop flight operations were nearly abandoned, the truth was that 
nonstop flight activity rose 4% from 1978 to 1983 (Civil Aeronautics Board, 1984). In 
fact, "the percentage of 145 cities connected with large, medium, and small cities (by 
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FAA's definition) by nonstop flights was 31%, 14%, and 5% for 1977. They increased to 
34%, 17%, and 6% for 1984" (Ghafouri-Barzand, 1986, p. 12). 
While airlines began to schedule hub and spoke systems in an effort to decrease 
the cost per passenger, airlines were still aware of the preference of passengers for non-
stop to connecting flights (Peterpaul, 1993). Next to non-stop service, Peterpaul (1993) 
found that there was a preference among consumers for direct flights, followed by 
connecting to another flight on the same airline. A direct flight provides the convenience 
that a passenger does not need to deplane prior to the next flight segment and connecting 
on the same airline allows a passenger to transfer to another flight within the same 
terminal area. The passenger views these possibilities as decreased travel 
inconveniences, and decreased concern over baggage mishandling (Peterpaul, 1993). 
As a function of service quality, Hansen (1988) described an s-curve effect for 
direct service at a market share ratio of 2.45 to 1. A clear advantage for airlines offering 
direct service. He also found a 2.19 to 1 market share ratio for increased frequencies. 
His studies concluded that a minimum frequency is more important than the maximum, 
but that having the maximum frequency did provide more market share as consumers in a 
hubbed service "can diminish layover times and thereby improve service quality" 
(Hansen, 1988, p. 91). 
Airlines strove to offer a service advantage by providing direct and on-line flight 
connections. This strategy also served to maximize the amount of traffic flowing over 
the hub (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). By 1990, 52% of passengers on trips over 1,500 
miles changed planes to complete their flight, this rose from 42% in 1978. Over the same 
time period, "the percentage of all trips that included a change of airline fell from 11.2% 
in 1978 to 1.2% in 1990" (Dana & Schmitt, 1995, p. 5). 
These studies also resulted in a competitive mindset for short and medium haul 
feeder markets. The strategy included providing the most frequency into the hub, thereby 
making it harder for a competitor to route traffic away from a hub and spoke system 
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(Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). This created a new issue for airlines who had been 
focusing on purchasing numerous large aircraft to meet passenger service quality 
requirements. When an airline operates with more frequencies, unless the market size 
continues to increase, the average size of the required aircraft gets smaller. However, the 
conduit routes continued to create a need for larger aircraft (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). 
The fare equation in total travel cost also began to show deregulation variance. 
Travelers appeared to react to fares charged for air travel; showing elasticity in a large 
number of city-pairs (Abrahams, 1983). An econometric analysis performed by Ghobrial 
and Kanafani (1995) found that when comparing flight frequency during peak periods, 
aircraft size, and travel times, "the demand was elastic with respect to airfare and was 
highly dependent on flight schedule and travel time (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). Long-
haul and vacation travelers showed more elasticity than short-haul and business traffic. 
However, there was a threshold for short-haul routes when the cost of airline travel 
approached the total travel cost for driving. At this point, levels of traffic in both the 
business and vacation segments declined (Abrahams, 1983). 
Ghobrial and Kanafani (1995) showed that airfare was influenced by market 
concentration and level of service. Markets served predominately by a single carrier 
tended to have higher fares. However, they also depended upon whether the predominant 
trip purpose was business or non-business, and the capacity constraints of the utilized 
airports (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). Airlines recognized that business travelers were 
willing to pay for frequent departures and last minute seat availability (Abrahams, 1983). 
"Service characteristics for this customer segment include flight schedule and load factor 
rather than amenities such as food and drinks. Other segments of the public prefer a 
lower fare, even though this meant a reduction in the quality of service" (O'Connor, 
1989, p. 91). The overall result was that in 1986, 90% of all airline passengers flew at a 
fare discount averaging 61% (Gourdin, 1988). 
Due to runway lengths, gate space, airport improvement charges, and allowed 
hours of operation, airline analysts became interested in what factors caused a passenger 
to choose one airport over the other. Airports farther away from the main population can 
produce service improvements due to a decrease in the amount of airspace congestion 
and a lower operating cost to the airline, thereby reducing the overall fare to consumers 
(Ashford & Benchemam (1987). 
Elasticity demand models performed by Ashford and Benchemam (1987) showed 
that airport choice was not equally responsive to changes in access time, flight frequency 
and airfare. The accessibility variable was more important than flight frequency for all 
passengers. The fare variable was found only to be significant for leisure and domestic 
passengers. Therefore, leisure and domestic passengers could be attracted to one airport 
or another by a lower fare, but business travelers were much more influenced by changes 
in flight frequency (Asheford & Benchemam, 1987). 
Russon and HoUingshead (1989) expanded this theory to include the use of small 
aircraft as a service variable. They found that for service to cities with multiple airports, 
other quality of service characteristics needed to improve for passengers to choose an 
airport with airlines utilizing smaller aircraft. Similarly, they found that the frequency, 
delay, and overall transport time needed to be adjusted for price and discomfort variables, 
otherwise, passengers would not choose to fly from the secondary airport. 
Airlines could not cost effectively provide high levels of customer service while 
meeting the consumer demand for increased frequency, lower overall travel times, and 
lower fares. It became unreasonable for travelers to expect a great deal of personal 
service, fancy food, or spacious seating at low rates. Airlines increased focus on the first 
and business class products to meet needs in this segment of the market (Conine, 1987). 
It was at this point that airlines recognized that consumers choose airlines based 
on their perceived level of overall service (Ashford & Benchemam, 1987). 
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O'Connor (1989) found that if 
there are two airlines in the market and one has 60 percent of the capacity, 
prospective passengers will tend to think first of this dominant carrier when they 
decide to reserve space on a flight. They will also be more likely to find the most 
desirable departure time and available space on that carrier. Thus, the airline with 
60 percent of the total capacity will win more than 60 percent of the traffic (p. 88-
89). 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, United States and European carriers adopted a 
predominant competitive strategy of adding frequencies and retaining a passenger 
throughout the entire trip (Bamber, 1997). Alliances with foreign carriers allowed an 
airline to develop a worldwide network. Efficiency was obtained because there were 
very few city-pairs in the world which generated enough passengers to support nonstop 
services. Carriers explored connections with alliance partners to increase the share of 
traffic between partner carriers. While there was the potential to increase market share, 
the advantages of joint mileage programs, handling each other's flights, and sharing 
terminal and sales environments was believed to provide substantial savings for both 
carriers (Bamber, 1997). 
There has also been a trend towards teaming up with feeder airlines specializing 
in the utilization of 19 to 72 seat aircraft. In some cases, the hub carrier may have a 
partial or complete financial holding in the feeder carrier. Traditionally, the partnership 
involves the feeder carrier adopting the hub carrier's flight designator, rescheduling its 
flights to connect into the hub carrier's banks, and implementing marketing programs to 
include through check-in, joint use of lounges, and mileage credits. In most cases, the 
smaller aircraft are repainted in the larger carrier's colors and employees will wear the 
larger carrier's uniform. The result is to give breadth to an airline by providing access to 
smaller regional markets and increase overall load factor by bringing more passengers 
through a hub carrier's system (Bamber, 1997). 
The evolving worldwide trend towards a less regulated environment has created 
renewed interest in the applicability of the s-curve. As governments review the 
competitive environment for carriers to enter new markets and new carriers to make an 
impact on operating systems, the s-curve has provided some insight for decision makers 
on this subject. 
The October 2000 decision by Mexico's Federal Competition Commission 
regarding the separate public sale of Aeromexico and Mexicana cites a competitive 
response deficiency in the s-curve. In a statement of points presented by the 
Commission, it assumed the effect of the s-curve was limited to flow versus local 
markets. In part, the commission used this argument to defend the potential for 
Aeromexico and Mexicana to successfully coexist with headquarters operations at 
Mexico City Airport (Federal Competition Commission, 2000). 
At nearly the same time, the U.S. Department of Transportation began an 
investigation into predatory practices in the commercial aviation industry. In the federal 
notice dedicated to this investigation, the s-curve was described as existing in "local 
markets served by more than one carrier, where the major carrier's higher frequency 
attracts a greater share of the local traffic than that carrier would otherwise carry" 
(Hunnicutt, 1998). The Boyd Group/ASRC, Inc. (1998) identified the difficulty carriers 
have entering new markets as a result of the effects of the s-curve. They noted that "very 
rarely does a new carrier have capacity available to establish itself in a position of 
strength in a market large enough to support the service" (p. 11). 
Finally, when the Canadian Government recommended changes to its aviation 
policy, general understandings of the s-curve were used to describe concern for predatory 
practices. Based on these concerns, it was recommended that the Governor-in-Council 
be given the authority to issue cease and desist orders to air carriers (von Finckenstein, 
1999). 
Models for describing the behavior of individuals in choice situations have wide 
applicability for established and new airlines, governments, and regulatory environments. 
Bruzelius and Magnus (1981) cite the benefits of economic modeling to "study the effect 
on traffic flow of some hypothetical or expected change in the cost of transportation from 
one city to another when more than one alternative is open to the traveler." Ghobrial and 
Kanafani (1995) support this conclusion, adding that modeling needs to include more 
quality of service variables. 
Understanding the forces that affect demand for carrier service is critical to 
effective carrier decisions on operating, pricing, yield management, and 
marketing/promotional strategies. Measuring the factors affecting air traffic 
growth at the market level is critical to effective decisions on route structure, 
expansion to new markets, fleet size and composition, and the level of carrier 
service by origin market and city pair (Proussaloglou, 1994, p. 2). 
Statement of the Hypothesis 
Since the early 1970's, airline analysts have speculated that an s-curve 
phenomena exists; so that as a carrier increases service/capacity on an origin and 
destination or in a city, that carrier will receive a passenger/revenue share greater than its 
capacity share. The researcher is unaware of any current, accepted methodology, for 
measuring this effect with any degree of reliability. Therefore, the researcher asked the 
following questions. "Does the s-curve exist?" If so, "Is the s-curve a route 
phenomenon or a city phenomenon?" And, "Do rankings for service levels affect the s-
curve?" 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Samples 
The samples for this study were composed of origin and destination (O&D) 
operations in the United States (U.S.) as operated by U.S. air carriers for the 1995 and 
1996 calendar years. Four quarters worth of data were evaluated for the two years 
selected. While this constitutes an enormous amount of raw data, the sample selection 
represents 10% of the carrier operations in the United States. 
The data reported to the US Department of Transportation (DOT), Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, is based on an industry comprised of 260 U.S. airlines and 215 
foreign reporting airlines. The Office of Airline Information (OAT) compiles 12,000 
paper financial reports and 2,100 computer disks/tapes of financial and market/traffic 
statistics annually to prepare the DOT data. The information is currently gathered from 
passenger tickets collected at the airport gate using a sample of approximately 10 percent 
of domestic and international air travel trips on U.S. carriers. For example, of the nearly 
35 million tickets sold each quarter, approximately 2.5 million records, both paper and 
computer, are generated by the airlines, compiled, and sent to the department's Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics for review. 
Instrument 
The samples for this study were obtained through the O&D Plus Database as 
published by Data Base Products, Inc. The information for this database is derived from 
the comprehensive financial and market/traffic statistical economic data reported from 
the air transportation industry via a quarterly survey of airline passenger traffic. This 
14 
data is then published by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Airline 
Information. 
The O&D data provided includes the point of origin, the air carrier of each flight 
segment, the fare basis code (i.e., first class, coach, and discount coach fares), stopover 
points, the destination, the number of passengers, and the actual airfare. The DOT 
requires a 95% accuracy rate on this data from the air carriers. The information is used 
by the government to analyze airline competition, select and approve air carriers for 
international routes, monitor airfares, and make decisions on the distribution of grants to 
airports. In addition, this data is used by airlines and aircraft manufacturers in the 
industry to make route, fleet, and demand decisions. 
In 1997, an audit was conducted by the Inspector General which found that 69% 
of the 8,894 city-pairs reviewed did not meet the 95% accuracy criteria sought by the 
department (Office of the Inspector General, 1998). For example, in 643 flight 
segments, the O&D passenger counts were misreported in a range extending from 31% to 
40%. While the Inspector General found the data collection system obsolete and the data 
collected unreliable, this is the only data currently available to analyze large scale O&D 
traffic in the U.S. airport system. 
Design 
The research method used in this study was Correlational, as outlined in the 
textbook Educational Research, by Gay (1992). This method of research was chosen 
because it was necessary to establish whether or not a relationship exists between service 
variables and the resulting market/passenger share in order to determine if an s-curve 
exists. The critical variables that were controlled include the resulting market share, 
whereas uncontrolled variables were cities of origin, route O&D's, connections, 
nonstops, the weighting of data points by size, carrier dominance in the market, low cost 
carriers, and total passengers. 
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Procedure 
Industry speculation has been that as a carrier increases its service/capacity share 
on a route or at a city, that carrier will receive a passenger/revenue share greater than its 
capacity share. Figure 1 depicts the theoretical s-curve which represents this theory. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical S-Curve. Percentage of Market Share by Service Share. 
In order to identify the existence and shape of the s-curve, O&D data for the years 
1995 and 1996 was analyzed with the least squares regression model to determine the line 
fitted to the data. Regression analysis allows us to determine which line best fits or 
models the data (Jaisingh, 2000). 
This regression model was chosen because our hypothesis assumes there is a 
relationship between the values of X and Y. The least-square criterion is described by 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976, pp. 6-10) as 
minimizing the total spread of y values from the line; creating the line of best fit. 
The linear equation is as follows: 
Y = a + bX, 
Y is the dependent variable and X the independent variable. Since we wish to 
minimize the vertical sum of the squared deviations from the fitted line, the 
equation is restated as: 
Minimizeyj Yl-Yl 
1=1 
Y, =a + bX, 
is the fitted value of Y corresponding to a particular observation X,, and N is the 
number of observations. 
The least-squared slope estimate is determined as: 
The least-squares intercept can be obtained through: 
A = Y-bX 
The values for X and Y are the means for X and Y, derived from: 
X = ^ - and Y=-^-
N N 
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Following these computations, an Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) must be performed 
to determine if the line produced is actually a good fit. This means that the data plotted 
on the scatter plot has a small deviation, as compared to the total spread of data points, to 
the line (Gonick & Smith, 1993). 
The squared correlation of this data is defined as: 
1,(1-yf 
The closer R2 is to 1, the tighter the fit of the curve (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, p. 35). 
R2 values close to 1 imply that the model is explaining most of the 
variation in the dependent variable and may be a very useful model. R values 
close to 0 imply that the model is explaining little of the variation in the 
dependent variable and may not be a useful model (Jaisingh, 2000, p. 91). 
R2 =1 corresponds to a perfect fit of the dependent variable. Therefore, if 
an R2 is described as .822, 82% of the variation is explained by the X variable and 
the other 18% is error. A negative R indicates that the X variable is negatively 
related to Y (Gonick & Smith, 1993, p. 195-196). 
The second method used to test the validity of the linear regression model is 
testing of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis will be accepted if the slope of the 
regression line is 0. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we accept that the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, until additional testing is performed (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976). 
The third procedure for testing the regression equation includes testing the 
existence of a linear relationship between X and Y. A strong statistical relationship 
between X and Y will result in a large ration of explained to unexplained variance 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976). In testing the null hypothesis, a high value for the F 
statistic is rationale for rejecting the null hypothesis. "If the value is close to 0, it must be 
concluded that the explanatory variables do little to explain the variation of Y about its 
mean" (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976, p. 60). 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS 
In testing the hypothesis for the existence of the s-curve, the first step was to 
identify where there was a high level of data relevance. Once a positive correlation 
between data could be determined, testing for factors which influence the existence of the 
s-curve could begin. 
Initial testing was conducted at a city level, comparing frequency and passenger 
share. The data was simplified through the elimination of path quality factors by 
focusing on routes with no nonstop service. Table 1 indicates the progression of the 
testing for the s-curve at the city level. Testing all of the markets resulted in a very poor 
relevance between data (Table 1, Trial 1). Table 1, Trial 2, dealt with the elimination of 
very small markets and their high sampling errors; however, it also resulted in a bad fit of 
data. Table 1, Trial 3, dealt with limiting the size of the market even further, with the 
result that market thresholds do not improve the data relevance. Table 1, Trial 4, 
eliminates Southwest Airlines under the theory that this carrier caters to passengers that 
are fare hunters and are not service driven. This did not improve the data relevance. 
Table 1, Trail 5, tried to identify whether or not there was something unique about being 
the top carrier in the market. The results of this analysis were not good. Table 1, Trail 6, 
tests a large carrier with many markets. By focusing on one airline, the theory was that 
data noise due to differences in marketing strategies was eliminated. Limiting the data 
field worsened the results. Table 1, Trial 7, combined the theories behind Trials 5 and 6 
by focusing on an airline where it was number one in the market. The data results were 
even less relevant. Table 1, Trial 8, sought to answer the question of whether path 
quality was integral to the process of understanding the s-curve. While the results were 
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slightly more promising, with an R2 of .64, the multi-variant regression required to 
continue testing was outside the scope of this project. 
In Step 2 of Table 1, experimentation with different types of data-weighting was 
tried to assist with the correlation. Weighting was introduced to account for differences 
in city size. Weighting of the cities gave small cities less total value. The results for city-
based data weighting improved slightly. In Table 1, Trials 14 and 15, markets were 
eliminated with a theoretical or actual share of the market at less than 20% and greater 
than 80%. This was done in an effort to eliminate outlying data and improve data 
correlation. This effort failed and it was then understood that most of the data being 
evaluated was in markets with less than a 20% share. By eliminating this segment of the 
market, most of the testable data was eliminated and the data relevance diminished. The 
conclusion from Table 1 was that there is no pattern identifying an s-curve on a passenger 
origin and destination basis at the city level. 
Table 1 
Frequency Versus Passenger Share for Origins and Destinations with No Nonstops 
Variable R^  Slope Intercept F 
Stepl 
1. All carriers, all markets 
2. Carriers with >50 pax per 
market 
3. Carriers with > 20 pax per 
market 
4. All carriers without Southwest 
Airlines 
5. Top Carrier in each market 
6. American Airlines, all markets 
7. American Airlines where 
leading in market share 
8. Quality Service Index (QSI)a 
versus connection share 
Step 2 
9. All carriers, all markets incl. 
props, weighted by size 
10. All carriers, all markets, 
weighted by size 
11. All carriers, all markets, 
weighted by pax 
12. All carriers, all markets 
weighted by pax, market, and 
.498 
.538 
.510 
.470 
.394 
.360 
.260 
.640 
.56 
.54 
.536 
.533 
.87 
.80 
.80 
.72 
~ 
.68 
.48 
.90 
~ 
.97 
.91 
.93 
.04 
.007 
.087 
airline presence 
13. All carriers, all markets, no .517 .92 .007 
weights 
14. Theoretical 20/80b, no weights .340 .90 .015 
15. Actual 20/80c, no weights .251 .51 .228 
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. Step 1 data includes jet and propeller driven 
aircraft. Step 2 data contains no propeller driven aircraft and is weighted (where indicated) by 
data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For example, a market with 1000 
passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100 passengers. From Form 41, 3rd 
Quarter 1995, Origin and Destinations (O&D) with connections. 
aSee Appendix A. bElimination of markets with a share less than 20% and greater than 80% of 
overall data totals. Elimination of markets with a share less than 20% and greater than 80% by 
O&D. 
In Table 2, combinations of service and passenger share at hub cities were 
compared to determine if there was a correlation between data. If the fit was good, that 
would indicate that the s-curve exists at the hub level. To accomplish this testing, data 
was collected by airline, by route, and summed to a hub basis. For example, American 
Airlines flights from Dallas to Albuquerque, Dallas to Denver, and Dallas to Seattle were 
summed and used as one Dallas data point. The tests performed in Table 2 show that the 
relevance of the data was good no matter the form of the model tested. The conclusion 
from Table 2 was that the data relevance is much improved on a hub basis versus a 
passenger origin and destination basis. 
Table 2 
Service Share Versus Passenger Share Combinations by Hub City 
Variable R^ Slope Intercept F 
16. Pax share vs. dept. share, .910 1.05 -.0038 344,160* 
weighted by total seats3 
17. Pax share vs. dept. share, .920 0.00 .98 
weighted by departures 
18. Pax share vs. dept. share, .904 1.03 -.003 
weighted by dept. in Seattleb 
19. Pax share vs. seat share, .977 1.004 -.0008 
weighted by total seats 
20. Pax share vs. seat share, .992 1.01 -.0012 4,021,576* 
weighted by total seats3 
21. Pax share vs. ASM share, .938 .954 .0034 516,585* 
weighted by total ASMs 
22. RPM share vs. dept. share, .796 1.01 -.0011 132,288* 
weighted by total seats 
23. RPM share vs. seat share, .920 1.01 -.0008 388,201* 
weighted by total seats 
24. RPM share vs. ASM share, .997 1.02 -.0013 12,558,676* 
weighted by total ASMs 
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. Hub cities include ATL, CLT, CVG, DAL, 
DEN, DFW, DTW, EWR, IAD, IAH, JFK, LAS, LAX, MSP, ORD, PHL, PHX, PIT, SEA, SFO, 
SLC, STL. All data is weighted by data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For 
example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100 
passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996, by airline, by route, summed 
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to the origin level with hub cities only. Elimination of carriers with 0, 1, or 100 observations. 
bArbitrary city choice to test city phenomenon. 
* p < .0001 
The testing conducted for Table 3, Step 1, was to identify whether or not 
passenger share is disproportionately larger in cities with greater capacity share. Testing 
data on a city basis resulted in a good data relevance. Trial 30 (Table 3, Step 1), 
compared total RPM share versus ASM share, weighting total ASMs. Trial 26 (Table 3, 
Step 1), compared passenger share and seat share, weighting total seats. The results from 
both of these tests showed a strong correlation between the data and a slope greater than 
1; indicating the potential for the s-curve to exist. Having achieved a high level of data 
relevance for these two tests, the next step was to identify whether or not the relationships 
were different at different share levels. In Table 3, Steps 2 and 3, continued refinement 
of RPM share versus ASM share was conducted to identify the s-curve more finely. The 
results of Table 3, Step 2, identify an S-curve. The R2s are good and the slopes are 
greater than 1 in many instances. The poor results in Step 3 suggest that a 10 zone 
evaluation of the data cuts the data too narrowly, resulting in poor dispersion and the 
inability for the model to fit a good slope line and, consequently, results in a poor R2. 
Table 3 
Service Share Versus Passenger Share Combinations for All Cities 
Variable R^  Slope Intercept F 
Stepl 
25. Pax share vs. dept. share, .777 .94 .0099 118,316* 
weighted by total seats 
26. Pax share vs. seat share, .960 1.01 -.0009 805,212* 
weighted by total seats 
27. Pax share vs. ASM share, .853 .95 .0091 195,977* 
weighted by total ASMs 
28. RPM share vs. dept. share, .604 .83 .0279 51,665* 
weighted by total seats 
29. RPM share vs. seat share, .832 .93 .0105 167,499* 
weighted by total seats 
30. RPM share vs. ASM share, .978 1.01 -.0015 1,529,054* 
weighted by total ASMs 
Step 2 
31. RPM share vs. ASM share, .985 1.01 -.0008 1,680,903* 
weighted by total ASMs: 
0-20% ASM share 
32. RPM share vs. ASM share, .911 1.01 -.0052 47,318* 
weighted by total ASMs: 
21-40% ASM share 
33. RPM share vs. ASM share, .841 1.07 -.0265 12,653* 
weighted by total ASMs: 
41-60% ASM share 
34. RPM share vs. ASM share, .914 .97 .0402 13, 
weighted by total ASMs: 
61-80% ASM share 
35. RPM share vs. ASM share, .970 .93 .0721 23,384* 
weighted by total ASMs: 
81-100% ASM share 
Step 3 
36. RPM share vs. ASM share, .905 1.00 -.0008 185,892* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
0-10% ASM share 
37. RPM share vs. ASM share, .506 1.03 -.0043 5387* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
11-20% ASM share 
38. RPM share vs. ASM share, .314 .96 .0059 1314* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
21-30% ASM share 
39. RPM share vs. ASM share, .247 1.07 -.0296 575* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
31-40% ASM share 
40. RPM share vs. ASM share, .208 1.03 -.0112 355* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
41-50% ASM share 
41. RPM share vs. ASM share, .208 1.08 -.0347 274* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
51-60% ASM share 
42. RPM share vs. ASM share, .214 1.15 -.0792 216* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
61-70% ASM share 
43. RPM share vs. ASM share, .086 .77 .1802 47* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
71-80% ASM share 
44. RPM share vs. ASM share, .132 .84 .1320 61* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
81-90% ASM share 
45. RPM share vs. ASM share, .448 .95 .0466 267* 
weighted by total ASMs; 
91-100% ASM share 
Note. All data is weighted by data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For 
example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100 
passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996, by airline, by route, summed 
to the origin level with all cities. 
* /X.0001 
Table 4 shows the further refinement of the s-curve data regarding passenger 
share versus seat share. These trials measured spent capacity and produced capacity; 
meaning that it measured the seat share allocated by a carrier against that carrier's 
resulting passenger share. Again, the poor results in Table 4, Step 2, suggest that a 10 
zone evaluation of the data cuts the data too narrowly, resulting in poor dispersion and 
the inability for the model to fit a good slope line and, consequently, results in a poor R2. 
A comparison of Table 3, Step 1, and Table 4 shows that the s-curve was more 
robust when determined by seats rather than departures. This indicates that a marginal 
investment in seats results in more passengers. Airlines may be more focused on having 
the right size aircraft, conceding the right number of departures to the perceived 
competitive environment. There is a need for further research to investigate this 
phenomenon with the use of QSI and airline image measures. 
Table 4 
Spent Capacity Versus Produced Capacity in All Cities 
Variable R^ Slope Intercept F 
Step 1 
46. Pax share vs. seat share, .956 1.01 -.0005 536,279* 
weighted by total seats: 
0-20%) seat share 
47. Pax share vs. seat share, .697 .90 .0210 10,624* 
weighted by total seats: 
21-40% seat share 
48. Pax share vs. seat share, .770 1.13 -.0535 7937* 
weighted by total seats: 
41-60% seat share 
49. Pax share vs. seat share, .778 .93 .0693 4945* 
weighted by total seats: 
61-80% seat share 
50. Pax share vs. seat share, .915 .95 .0595 6521* 
weighted by total seats: 
81-100% seat share 
Step 2 
51. Pax share vs. seat share, .942 1.02 -.0008 326,756* 
weighted by total seats: 
0-10% seat share 
52. Pax share vs. seat share, .614 1.01 -.0024 7775* 
weighted by total seats: 
11-20%) seat share 
53. Pax share vs. seat share, .397 .84 .0371 1663* 
weighted by total seats: 
21-30% seat share 
54. Pax share vs. seat share, .340 1.04 -.0260 1073* 
weighted by total seats: 
31-40% seat share 
55. Pax share vs. seat share, .442 1.20 -.0851 911* 
weighted by total seats: 
41-50% seat share 
56. Pax share vs. seat share, .508 1.29 -.1424 1157* 
weighted by total seats: 
51-60% seat share 
57. Pax share vs. seat share, 
weighted by total seats: 
61-70% seat share 
58. Pax share vs. seat share, .365 .88 .1013 509* 
weighted by total seats: 
71-80% seat share 
59. Pax share vs. seat share, .547 .79 .1720 633* 
weighted by total seats: 
81-90% seat share 
60. Pax share vs. seat share, .787 .98 .0292 998* 
weighted by total seats: 
91-100% seat share 
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. All data is weighted by data point size at the 
rate of lx the size of the sample. For example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times 
as much as a market with 100 passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996, 
by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities. 
* p<.000\ 
Tables 5 and 6 sought to identify the existence of the s-curve by carrier strength in 
the market. This would indicate whether or not being the strongest carrier in a market 
provided an advantage with the s-curve. Table 4 results showed strong data relevance 
and s-curve indicators without city weighting, therefore, testing for Tables 5 and 6 was 
completed without this weighting. The R2s fall as the zone share gets higher because 
there was less data, resulting in increased randomness. 
A comparison of the results from Tables 5 and 6 indicated that the stronger an 
airline was in a market, the greater its ability to benefit from the s-curve. When the data 
was examined by carrier ranking, RPM versus ASM received much more robust results 
than passenger share versus seat share. This may be due to airlines being much more 
careful with the allocation of ASMs than the allocation of seats. When confronted with a 
fleeting decision, a carrier would be much more careful allocating the correct sized 
aircraft on the Chicago to Kona route and less careful with the Chicago to Seattle route. 
Table 5 
Passenger Share Versus Seat Share for All Cities by Carrier 
Variable R^  Slope Intercept F 
Stepl 
61. Pax share vs. seat share, .212 .92 .0477 22* 
Carrier #1: 0-20% seat share 
62. Pax share vs. seat share, .401 .94 .0412 1037* 
Carrier # 1: 21-40% seat share 
63. Pax share vs. seat share, .382 .94 .0675 1135* 
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Carrier #1:41 -60% seat share 
64. Pax share vs. seat share, .329 .94 .0657 671* 
Carrier # 1: 61-80% seat share 
65. Pax share vs. seat share, .605 .85 .1329 928* 
Carrier #1: 81-100% seat share 
Step 2 
66. Pax share vs. seat share, .744 1.01 .0116 6748* 
Carrier #2: 0-20% seat share 
67. Pax share vs. seat share, .327 .710 .0662 1237* 
Carrier #2: 21-40% seat share 
68. Pax share vs. seat share, .073 .41 .1976 42* 
Carrier #2: 41-60% seat share 
69. Pax share vs. seat share, .134 -.69 .8718 6** 
Carrier #2: 61-80% seat share 
70. Pax share vs. seat share, 
Carrier #2: 81-100% seat share 
Step 3 
71. Pax share vs. seat share, .775 .91 .0106 12,266* 
Carrier #3: 0-20% seat share 
72. Pax share vs. seat share, .020 .17 .1410 9*** 
Carrier #3: 21-40% seat share 
73. Pax share vs. seat share, 1.0 -.91 .594 
Carrier #3: 41-60% seat share 
74. Pax share vs. seat share, 
Carrier #3: 61-80%) seat share 
75. Pax share vs. seat share, 
Carrier #3: 81-100% seat share 
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 
and 1996, by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities. 
* /?<.0001, **p<.0157, ***p<.0026 
Table 6 
Service Share Versus Passenger Share for All Cities by Carrier 
Variable Rf Slope Intercept F 
Stepl 
76. RPM share vs. ASM share, .952 1.17 -.0123 1618* 
Carrier #1: 0-20% ASM share 
77. RPM share vs. ASM share, .914 1.06 -.0070 16,532* 
Carrier #1: 21-40% ASM share 
78. RPM share vs. ASM share, .912 1.08 -.0171 19,052* 
Carrier #1: 41-60% ASM share 
79. RPM share vs. ASM share, .896 1.05 -.0208 11,817* 
Carrier #1: 61-80% ASM share 
80. RPM share vs. ASM share, .736 1.15 .1483 1685* 
Carrier #1:81-100% ASM 
share 
Step 2 
81. RPM share vs. ASM share, .875 1.09 -.0016 16,172* 
Carrier #2: 0-20% ASM share 
82. RPM share vs. ASM share, .908 1.02 -.0153 25,180* 
Carrier #2: 21-40% ASM share 
83. RPM share vs. ASM share, .835 1.05 -.0650 2686* 
Carrier #2: 41-60% ASM share 
84. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #2: 61-80% ASM share 
85. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #2: 81-100% ASM 
share 
Step 3 
86. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #3: 0-20% ASM share 
87. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #3: 21-40% ASM share 
88. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #3: 41-60% ASM share 
89. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #3: 61-80% ASM share 
90. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #3: 81-100% ASM 
share 
Step 4 
91. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #4: 0-20% ASM share 
92. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #4: 21-40% ASM share 
93. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #4: 41-60% ASM share 
94. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #4: 61-80% ASM share 
95. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #4: 81-100% ASM 
share 
Step 5 
96. RPM share vs. ASM share, .922 .97 .0010 31,158* 
Carrier #5: 0-20% ASM share 
97. RPM share vs. ASM share, .752 .37 .1541 15* 
Carrier #5: 21-40% ASM 
share 
98. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #5: 41-60% ASM share 
99. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #5: 61-80% ASM share 
100. RPM share vs. ASM share, 
Carrier #5: 81-100% ASM 
share 
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 
and 1996, by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities. 
* »<.0001 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
The s-curve exists for dominant carriers in a market and can be most effectively 
analyzed with RPM share versus ASM share at the city level, summed to the origin. 
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Figure 2. RPM Share versus ASM Share for all Carriers and all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
The data indicates that if you are the number 1 carrier in a city, you will get a 
positive marginal value for an investment in capacity. 
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Figure 3. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #1 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
The number 2 carrier in a city also has some potential for receiving a positive 
marginal value for investment in capacity. Especially if they own nearly 30% of the 
capacity share. 
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Figure 4. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #2 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
Beginning with the third carrier in a city, carriers generally do not receive a fair 
share of revenue passengers for the capacity they offer to the market. 
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Figure 5. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #3 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
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Figure 6. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #4 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
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Figure 7. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #5 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the 
Origin. 
ASM was most likely a better measure of capacity because airlines are more 
careful with ASMs than with seats. This means that when faced with a fleeting decision, 
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an airline would usually take greater care flying the correct size aircraft on Chicago to 
Kona than it would on Chicago to Detroit. 
While the most robust results could be found through an analysis of RPM share 
versus ASM share, passenger share versus seat share also showed positive results. The 
results of the passenger share versus seat share testing indicated that by adding more seats 
to the market, you would obtain a greater share of passengers. It does not appear that 
adding more departures has the same effect. This is contrary to the assumptions of most 
air carriers. 
The s-curve could not be identified at a passenger origin and destination level. 
The data relevance improved significantly when analyzed at the hub level and the city 
level, summed to the origin. 
In conclusion, the s-curve does exist. The s-curve is a city phenomenon and 
rankings for service levels have a significant impact on its affect on passenger/revenue 
share. 
CHAPTER V 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This author recommends continued evaluation of the s-curve phenomenon 
through a multi-variant regression analysis, including the use of QSI characteristics. 
Applying actual revenue data against the service share offered in a market would be an 
interesting comparative analysis for the s-curve. As the market continues to evolve with 
the emergence of alliance networks, it would also be of considerable interest to test the 
effects of the s-curve and the effectiveness of joint carriers to gain more than their fair 
share of the market. Finally, the ability to forecast the effects of carriers owning faster 
than current aircraft would be an interesting new test for the s-curve. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
QSI COEFFICIENTS 
Types of Service 
Nonstop 
One-stop ("Good") 
Two-stop 
Coefficient 
1.0000 
0.4500 
0.1500 
Single connection ("Good") 
Double connection 
Triple connection 
0.1500 
0.0250 
0.00416666 
Nonstop/through 
Connection/through 
Double connection/through 
0.0500 
0.0017 
0.00002833 
Commuter nonstop 
"Good" connection to commuter 
0.2500 
0.0375 
"Bad" one-stop 
"Bad" connection 
"Bad" connection to commuter 
0.189 
0.063 
0.016 
"Good" = service with elapsed time within 75 minutes of shortest elapsed time in market. 
"Bad" = elapsed time more than 75 minutes longer than shortest elapsed time in market. 
